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The International Monetary Fund was created to promote financial stability, global 
monetary cooperation, high employment, international trade and sustainable 
economic growth. Together with the World Bank, IMF has a “monopoly” on offering 
loan programs for countries in deep crises or for development projects. In this thesis, 
we examine the effect of IMF, i.e. loan size and quotas, on the economic growth and 
inflation rate, by applying a dynamic panel regression on our dataset. In addition, we 
look at how the IMF Quotas influence the size of the loans. Our empirical results 
display significant evidence that IMF loans influence the GDP growth in a positive 
manner, in the medium term. Both Control of Corruption and Voice & Accountability 
have a negative influence on the economic growth. In other words, less corruption 
and stronger civil rights will halt the growth level of the economy. We also 
determined that IMF Quotas is not a robust indicator of the loan size. It is only driven 
by the past loan levels. Regarding Inflation determinants, IMF loans are not affecting 
the Inflation in a significant manner, while FDI and Control of Corruption - do. FDI 
exercises a positive influence on the CPI, while perception of less corruption has a 
negative effect on Inflation rate. 
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1. Introduction 
The International Monetary Fund was created as an organization that was meant to 
center its attention towards overseeing the international monetary system. Its initial 
objectives were to foster international monetary cooperation and exchange rate 
stability, facilitate growth of international trade and assist in fighting the balance of 
payments crisis, among others. Today, through its lending activity and so-called 
“IMF Conditionality”, it is promoting financial stability, global monetary 
cooperation, high employment, international trade and sustainable economic growth. 
IMF strives toward its mission using three approaches: monitoring economic and 
financial activity of its member countries, “technical assistance” and training in 
drafting policies, and lending. The last one of the three approaches will be under 
close examination in this thesis, where we will test if it can actually bring an 
increased economic growth. The International Monetary Fund, together with the 
World Bank, can be considered “monopolies” on providing financing in case of crisis 
or for development projects. An alternative source of financing came into existence in 
July 2014, when BRICS countries signed a declaration to establish the New 
Development Bank. The decision to create this bank was motivated both by the lack 
of reform in IMF’s quotas and voting rights, as well as by the “Washington 
Consensus”
1
 policies, which were criticized for the “one size fits all” policy approach 
(Stiglitz 2004). These economic policies were encouraged as “universal cure for the 
economic troubles” by institutions based in Washington D.C. such as US Treasury 
Department, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. “Washington 
Consensus” policy prescriptions are at the base of the IMF Conditionality. As Joseph 
Stiglitz (2004)
2
 observed, these policy prescriptions were seeing the government as 
the problem and efficient markets as the solution. In their study of IMF programs, 
                                                          
1
 Washington Consensus is a term, seen as synonymous with “globalization”, which was coined by 
John Williamson - an English economist in 1989. 
2
 Stiglitz concluded that the only consensus in these policy prescriptions are two underlying problems: 
“excessive belief in market fundamentalism; and international economic institutions which have 
created unfair rules of the game and which have foisted the failed policies, particularly on developing 
countries which are dependent on them and donors for assistance.” 
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Barro & Lee (2005) applied a different approach to analyze the Fund’s influence. 
They modeled it as a political organization and found that Fund’s loan programs are 
inclined to be more frequent and larger when a country has a bigger quota and more 
professionals employed in the organization. In this paper, we will operate with the 
latest available data in analyzing if IMF’s quotas effect on economic output has 
changed in some way during the last nine years.        
During the Global Financial Crisis, the GDP of highly industrialized countries fell 
abruptly over a prolonged time, although the extent of gross domestic product loss 
did not match the one suffered in the Great Depression. Many developed nations 
suffered from exposure to the U.S. subprime market, which caused a slowdown of 
global industrial production and high unemployment. Developing countries were also 
impacted, above all, by the outflow of capital and reduction in trade. Recovery 
proved to be at a slow pace and longer than expected, due to lack of trust in financial 
institutions and households overloaded with debt, among others reasons. To contain 
the situation and prevent a larger economic downturn, governments of major 
advanced economies applied a series of traditional measures, as fiscal stimulus and 
expansionary monetary policy; as well as non-traditional ones, as the bailout of 
systemically important financial institutions and devaluation of national currency. 
This macroeconomic context triggered an increase in demand of funds from IMF, 
especially for the countries who could not afford paying from their own pockets to fix 
the economy.                      
Considering the lack of alternative financing sources and the extensive reach of 
IMF’s programs, it is important to know the ramifications of these loans on the 
economic growth and economic performance indicators, in general. Numerous 
studies found that loans provided by International Monetary Fund are reducing the 
economic output of borrower countries (Dreher, 2006; Barro & Lee, 2005; 
Hutchison, 2003; Przeworski & Vreeland, 2000). Theoretically, this international 
organization can influence economic activity through its policy advisory, lending and 
conditionality attached to the money. In the process of finding an answer on whether 
the countries will benefit from entering a loan agreement with IMF, we have to take 
into account the direction of causality. Hence, we need to be able to distinguish 
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between the effect of the preexisting economic context and the effects from the loan 
program. An appropriate approach for capturing these effects is the system GMM 
estimator, which was created to analyze the effect of lagged explanatory variables. In 
this thesis, we took an additional step in identifying the initial economic context. We 
included two dummy variables: one for countries in the Low Income and one for 
countries in the Middle Income category, according to classification methodology 
from the World Bank. In this way, we are able to analyze the effects for each income 
category. In addition to that, we included non-economic parameters, which are also 
representing the initial economic context within a state. These are variables from the 
World Governance Indicators (a World Bank project), which are capturing different 
dimensions of governance in a country. The use of these parameters in our study is 
motivated by the importance of governance in shaping laws and policies. From 
available empirical evidence, troubles created by the lack of governance are often 
spreading and are “contaminating” the economic system. According to a study of 
Kaufmann & Kraay (2002),
3
 “when the institutions of the state are “captured” by 
vested interests in this way, entrenched elites in a country can benefit from a 
worsening status quo of misgovernance and can successfully resist demands for 
change even as incomes rise”. He referred to the rise in economic output, without a 
strengthening of governance. It motivated the author of this thesis to include the 
Control of Corruption variable in this paper and test if corruption can be a cause of 
economic downturns. 
In the next section, we will describe the characteristics of the IMF loan 
implementation. It also includes a short summary of the literature on significance of 
the Fund’s loan programs on the GDP growth and a discussion about channels of 
influence of IMF on economic growth. Section 3 presents the methodology and 
models used in this thesis, as well as the data description. In Section 4, we will 
outline our empirical results, while section 5 concludes. 
 
                                                          
3
 Kaufmann & Kraay (2002) Growth Without Governance 
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2. Characteristics of the IMF 
After the disruption of the international monetary cooperation, which led to the Great 
Depression of the 1930s, 44 countries decided to found an institution that would 
focus on overseeing the international monetary system, i.e. “the system of exchange 
rates and international payments that enables countries (and their citizens) to transact 
with each other” (IMF 2014, IMF at a Glance, p. 1). The new international entity 
would warrant exchange rate stability and strengthen its member countries to 
eliminate exchange restrictions that crippled trade. The IMF was conceived close to 
the end of World War II, during the Bretton Woods Conference in July 1944, as a 
specialized agency of the United Nations. Since its creation, it has become an almost 
universal financial institution. 
The number of members in the International Monetary Fund rose from 44 states to 
189 at present. Any country that accepts the statutes of the organisation and conducts 
foreign policy can become a member. Nevertheless, the members of the IMF do not 
have an equal number of votes in the decision making process of the organization 
(Bordo and James, 2000). Each member contributes a quota subscription to the Fund. 
When joining the IMF, a country usually pays 25 percent of its quota in the form of 
SDRs and 75 percent in its own currency. Voting power of each country in the 
organisation is determined by the size of its quotas: “each member has 250 basic 
votes plus one additional vote for each SDR one hundred thousand of quota” (Bordo 
and James 2000, p. 5). Founding members determined their starting quotas at the 
Bretton Woods Conference in 1944, when the IMF was planned. National income 
and external trade volume were used as inputs in the quotas allocation model. The 
same principles were applied for the new members of the organisation. According to 
its charter, IMF should correct the general quotas every five years, in order to take 
into account changes in economic power of the member countries (IMF 2014, 
Quotas). Half of all the general reviews since 1950 resulted in an increase of the 
quotas size (Bordo and James, 2000). 
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The International Monetary Fund is accountable to the governments of its member 
countries. Its organisational structure consists of Board of Governors, Executive 
Board, Independent Evaluation Office and several departments and committees. The 
most important decision making body of the Fund is the Board of Governors, which 
is composed of one Governor and one Alternate Governor from each member 
country. The Board of Governors has ordinary meetings once a year, during the IMF-
World Bank Annual Meetings (IMF 2014, IMF at a Glance). A big part of the 
decision-making is done by the IMF’s Executive Board, which has 24 directors that 
oversee the day-to-day work of the Fund. Five directors are appointed by the largest 
five shareholders - the United States (42,122 million SDRs or 16.75% of the total 
IMF quotas), Japan (6.23%), Germany (5.81%), France (4.29%), the United Kingdom 
(4.29%) (IMF – Annual Report 2014: Appendix VI, p. 28). The other directors are 
elected by nineteen groupings of the remaining countries. In 2010, an Amendment of 
the IMF’s Articles of Agreement was agreed. It was supposed to introduce an 
Executive Board, whose members are all elected. The Managing Director is in charge 
of the activity of the Executive Board and it is also the head of the IMF staff. 
Executive Board Chairman is assisted by four Deputy Managing Directors (IMF 
2014, IMF at a Glance).                                                                                                         
IMF’s decisions are strongly influenced by the major shareholders. Voting process is 
done according to the size of a country's quota in the Fund. Some important decisions 
are approved only with special voting majorities of 85 percent (Bordo and James, 
2000). Thus, theoretically, USA together with a group of three Western European 
countries could have veto power. The managing director of the Fund has traditionally 
been a European. However, this fact did not stop the United States from exerting the 
strongest voice at the IMF. There were cases when it openly used this power to 
influence decisions (Kahler 1992 and Stone 2002).                                  
IMF’s staff consists of 2,119 professional and managerial staff and 459 staff at the 
support level, according to the IMF Annual Report 2014 (IMF 2014, Chapter 5, p. 
65). And half of the total employees are economists.                                                                                           
Today, the IMF has evolved into an organisation that has enough power to influence 
the development of the world economy. According to its original purposes, that were 
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formulated at Bretton Woods in 1944, and others that were added later, IMF’s 
functions include the following: 
1. „Surveillance” function aimed at “promoting world trade, and securing the 
general well-being of the world economy, through analysis and advice” 
(Bordo and James 2000, p. 6). It relates to organisation of a "machinery for 
consultation and collaboration on international monetary problems” (Bordo 
and James 2000, p. 6). Poor designed policies have a detrimental effect that, 
in some cases, can extend country borders. This is the reason why IMF is 
driven to influence the policies of its members. Surveillance function takes 
two main forms. First form is multilateral and it is based on a general study 
of the relationship between national economic policies and performance of 
the economy. It also includes forecasts based on a variety of scenarios 
(Bordo and James, 2000). This analysis is materialized in the form of a 
publication, called World Economic Outlook. IMF economists also work on 
reviews of the global capital markets, which are published as the 
International Capital Markets Reports (IMF, 2014). These two publications 
are highly respected. Their econometric models are considered very 
advanced. Second form is the bilateral surveillance, based on regular 
dialogue with member countries, which are known as Article IV 
consultations. These consultations are done on an annual basis (after a 
period in which they were less frequent). Some critics dismiss these reports 
on member countries as insufficiently derogatory. Primarily, because of the 
good relations with officials and ministers that develop over time (Bordo and 
James, 2000). This important function of the International Monetary Fund 
accounts for a significant part of the budget. 
2. Providing credits to member countries – so called „drawings on the Fund” in 
IMF terminology. Credit is traditionally provided in tranches and is 
conditional on the policy reforms required, the so-called conditionality. 
Usually the size of the tranches is set to 25% of a member’s quota. The first 
tranche, usually, is available without any discussion of policy (Bordo and 
James, 2000). In reality, to understand what are the sources of the IMF loan 
programs one needs to grasp the current state of international currency 
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markets. This is because, essentially, the Fund cannot distribute all the 
resources that constitute the quota. Using quotas, paid in national currency, 
for the purpose of support operations, either by a developing country or by a 
large emerging economy, can provoke a problem for that country. Hence, 
the Fund has strict limits in lending out the quotas paid in by its members 
with rich economies (Bordo and James 2000).  
3. Provider of subsidized credit – depends on the circumstances. In the 1970’s, 
the IMF has begun financing poor economies by giving them low interest 
credits. These countries were affected by increased cost of fuel, which they 
were importing. Initially, this ”interest subsidy” was financed by the sale of 
some units of Funds gold reserves (Bordo and James 2000, p. 10). Thus, 
IMF’s facilities for low-income countries were created and are known as 
Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility. These subsidized loans are given 
on a basis of per capita income and only if the country is eligible for World 
Bank’s concessional crediting under International Development Association. 
Today, one part of the subsidy is financed from interest from a Trust Fund 
started in the 1970’s. The second part of the subsidy consists of donations 
and loans from rich member countries. 
4. Another function that IMF undertook is creating supplementary reserves, in 
the form of a “currency” called SDR (Special Drawing Right). It is not a 
currency per se. Instead, it represents a reserve asset based on a basket of 
four international currencies—the euro, Japanese yen, pound sterling, and 
U.S. dollar - and held by IMF member countries (IMF 2014, Special 
Drawing Rights). It was created (according to the first Amendment of the 
Articles of Agreement) in case of a need for liquidity and to be used as a unit 
of account for the member country reserves. Nevertheless, because capital 
markets are generally liquid this requirement proved to be worthless. And as 
a result, there has been no issue of SDRs since the 1970’s. This means that 
the more recent members have not received allocation of SDRs. As a result, 
currently the SDR does not have a very important role in world monetary 
policy (Bordo and James 2000). 
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5. Data collection - which is disclosed in a standardized way in International 
Financial Statistics publication. Publishing the results and their availability 
to a wider public proved that surveillance can be more effective. The World 
Economic Outlook material is published as well. The IMF also publishes 
reports on international capital markets (Bordo and James 2000). 
6. Training and technical assistance – provided by the IMF Institute to member 
countries. It delivers helpful information and “know-how” on issues like 
central bank and Finance Ministries operation, fiscal policy and tax 
regulation etc. (Bordo and James 2000).   
Thus, the IMF has now transformed into the “crisis manager” and “development 
financier” for developing economies (Barro and Lee 2003, p. 7). 
2.1. Main lending facilities 
One of the first lending facilities IMF implemented is Stand-by Arrangement (SBA). 
It was motivated by the need of credit to solve their balance of payments issues. This 
was the reason Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) was created in June 1952. It is the most 
used lending instrument for emerging market countries. Although the rates for this 
lending facility are lower than private markets rates, they are considered non-
concessional. The typical Stand-By Arrangement covers a period of 12-24 months, 
but no more than 36 months, with repayments scheduled between 3 and a quarter and 
5 years from the date of the borrowing (IMF 2014, Lending). 
The Extended Fund Facility (EFF) is also used to help countries overcome balance of 
payments difficulties. It is designed to address complicated structural problems that 
usually may take more time to redress than macroeconomic imbalances. Under this 
type of program the IMF focuses on comprehensive actions to improve the processes 
of the markets and institutions, privatization of state-owned enterprises and reforming 
fiscal and financial sectors. This facility was introduced in 1974. The EFF 
arrangements are approved for periods up to 3 years, with a repayment period of 4.5 
to 10 years, in twelve semi-annual instalments (IMF 2014, Lending). 
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Extended Fund Facility (EFF) together with Stand-by Arrangements (SBA) are the 
main IMF programs, created to provide financial assistance to handle the balance of 
payments problems of the member countries in the short term. These programs are 
not supposed to cover low-income countries.  
The Flexible Credit Line (FCL) was created for trusted governments that are known 
for their good records of policy enactment. It represents a very different approach in 
how the IMF provides financial assistance to member countries. This is because, 
under this facility, the Fund is not imposing limits on the loan size and no ongoing 
conditions. The FCL is a credit line that can be renewed and countries have the right 
to extract funds from a credit line at any time within a previously agreed period. This 
period could be for either one or two years, with the condition that after the first year 
the eligibility is evaluated. Once a country is declared eligible (according to criteria 
agreed from the start) it can obtain all the available credit without any conditionality 
or tranches, contrary to the other IMF lending programs. Repayment should take 
place over a 3¼ to 5 year period (IMF 2014, Lending). 
The Precautionary and Liquidity Line (PLL) is created to flexibly meet the liquidity 
needs of countries with healthy economic fundamentals but with some limited 
vulnerabilities which makes impossible for them to use the Flexible Credit Line 
(FCL). This lending instrument “is intended to serve as insurance and help resolve 
crises” (IMF 2014, Lending). PLL arrangements are for a period of either six months 
or one to two years. A six-months PLL program can be renewed only after a two 
years of “cooling-off period” from the date of approval of the previous six-month 
PLL arrangement (IMF 2014, Lending). 
The Rapid Financing Instrument (RFI) provides fast and low-access credit to 
economies that need to solve urgent balance of payments problems, without the 
requirements needed for a full-blown program. It’s a product of an expansive reform 
whose goal was to bring a more flexible financial support from IMF. RFI can provide 
assistance to meet a wide range of urgent issues, including “commodity price shocks, 
natural disasters, post-conflict situations and emergencies resulting from fragility” 
(IMF 2014, Rapid Financing Instrument). The level of access depends on the balance 
of payments needs. Financial support allocated under this program has similar terms 
Characteristics of the IMF  10 
 
as the Stand-By Arrangements (SBA), the Flexible Credit Line (FCL) and 
Precautionary and Liquidity Line (PLL). RFI should be repaid within a period of 3¼ 
to 5 years (IMF 2014, Lending). 
The Trade Integration Mechanism (TIM) was created in April 2004 to help member 
countries to meet balance of payments deficits that might be caused by the newly 
implemented trade liberalization measures. This is not a special lending facility. It 
looks more like a policy designed to make resources more predictably available under 
existing IMF lending facilities (IMF 2014, Lending). 
To help low-income countries to overcome the severe shock caused by the Great 
Recession, the IMF has updated its facilities that were giving concessional loans and 
made them more flexible. In this way these lending instruments could meet 
increasing demand for financial assistance from countries that craved them. These 
changes became effective in January 2010. As a part of the new Poverty Reduction 
and Growth Trust (PRGT) were established three loan types: the Standby Credit 
Facility (SCF), the Extended Credit Facility (ECF) and the Rapid Credit Facility 
(RCF). The interest rate levels for all concessional facilities under the PRGT are 
reviewed by the Fund every two years. The next modifications made to interest rates 
should take place in the end of 2014 (IMF 2014, Lending). 
The Extended Credit Facility (ECF) provides credit to member countries with 
extensive balance of payments issues. The ECF took the place of the Poverty 
Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF), which was introduced in 1999. It was 
created as a part of a broad reform started in 2010. Initially it was under the Poverty 
Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT) facility and later it became the Fund’s main 
instrument for providing medium-term support to low income countries (LICs). ECF 
has “higher levels of access, more concessional financing terms, more flexible 
program design features, as well as streamlined and more focused conditionality” 
(IMF 2014, Lending). Its main goal is to make the country to become a stable and 
sustainable economy, which implies growth and poverty reduction policies. 
Financing under the ECF carries a zero interest rate till the end of 2014, with a grace 
period of 5½ years, and a final maturity of 10 years (IMF 2014, Lending). 
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The Rapid Credit Facility (RCF) represents a facility with rapid financial assistance, 
which has less conditionality, made available to low-income countries (LICs) that are 
dealing with urgent balance of payments problems. The RCF incorporates the Fund’s 
emergency financing, provides significantly lower lending costs, can be used in a 
broad range of situations, and focuses mainly on the countries objectives of growth 
and poverty reduction. It provides financial support to LICs and does not require 
usual IMF program conditionality. It can be used for a wide variety of situations like 
economic shocks or natural disasters. This program also includes support for policy 
implementation and can provide help to attract foreign aid. As in the case of 
Extended Credit Facility, financing cost under the RCF has a zero interest rate 
through 2014, a maturity of 10 years and a grace period of 5½ years (IMF 2014, 
Lending). 
The Standby Credit Facility (SCF) provides financing to member countries with low 
GDP with short-term balance of payments difficulties. It’s helpful under a wide range 
of problems, charges a low interest rate and can be used as precautionary measures. 
SCF program also puts a lot of effort in fulfilling growth and poverty reduction 
objectives. This lending tool supports LICs that suffer from short-term shocks and 
financing problems, even if they have reached a sustainable macroeconomic position. 
To be eligible country’s credit and adjustment needs are usually “expected to be 
resolved within two years” (IMF 2014, Standby Credit Facility). An arrangement 
under SCF program can range from 12 to 24 months. Because it is planned to cover 
short-term needs, it is restricted to two and a half for each five years. A loan under 
the Standby Credit Facility carries a 0.25% interest rate, but is subject to exceptional 
deduction of all interest payments on concessional loans due to the IMF through the 
end of 2014. The grace period for SCF is 4 years and final maturity is 8 years. It also 
stipulates an availability fee of 0.15% p.a. on the unused portion of the available 
credit during each six-month period (IMF 2014, Lending). 
Barro and Lee (2003) consider that these activities should be described as foreign aid 
and not as loan or adjustment programs. These financing instruments brought the 
IMF into what had traditionally been the World Bank’s area of concern (IMF 2014). 
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2.2. IMF conditionality 
IMF conditionality, in its broad definition, includes the adjustments made to the 
economic policies of a country in exchange for financial assistance provided by the 
Fund. The amount of resources provided by the IMF loan programs are made 
available in quarterly instalments and are conditional on the performance of the 
policy benchmarks and results of the implemented reforms (Barro and Lee 2003). 
When a country enters into a borrowing arrangement with the IMF, its government 
should be ready to improve its economic policies in order to solve the problems that 
made the government seek financial aid. These program conditions also serve to 
guarantee that the member country will be able to repay back the loan received from 
the Fund. Loan reforms implemented in 2010 modernized IMF conditionality so it 
will allow to encourage “national ownership of strong and effective policies” (IMF 
2014, Conditionality). 
The concept of Conditionality in a broad sense includes both the characteristics of 
IMF programs (macroeconomic and structural policies) and special instruments for 
monitoring progress to achieve the goals set by the country.  Conditionality is used to 
solve balance of payments issues without applying measures that are adverse to 
national or international prosperity. At the same time, these measures are meant to 
ensure that IMF resources will be repaid by the borrower and that the country’s 
economy will be strong enough to permit it. All conditions stated under an IMF 
arrangement must be crucial for reaching the macroeconomic goals (IMF 2014, 
Conditionality).                                                                                                                           
The member country, that has entered a financing agreement with the IMF, has 
primary responsibility for selection, design, and implementation of the reforms that 
will allow the goals of the program to be achieved. The program is initiated with a 
letter of intent that should be supplemented with a “memorandum of economic and 
financial policies” (IMF 2014, Conditionality). The country’s technicalities are 
dictating the goals of the program and policies required to be implemented. But, the 
underlying goal is fixing the balance of payments problems and reaching 
macroeconomic stability, while creating conditions for sustained, high-quality growth 
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and for reducing poverty, in the case of low-income countries (IMF 2014, 
Conditionality). 
In recent years, the Fund has become more flexible in how it operates and 
communicates with member countries on issues like structural reform of their 
economies. Conditionality ground rules were revised in 2002 after an extensive 
review. In March 2009, the IMF started a comprehensive reform to improve its ability 
to prevent and resolve crises, which allowed it to further modernize its conditionality 
structure. The new operational instructions indicate that conditions should be 
designed and focused according to countries’ different policies and economic context. 
Moreover, structural reforms are covered by analysis of broad program performance 
(IMF 2014, Conditionality).                                                                        
2.3. Economic growth and IMF programs 
Since the 1970s, the IMF ‘‘placed increasing emphasis on economic growth as a 
policy objective. Growth became increasingly prominent as an objective in the 
1980s’’ (Hardoy 2003). Since then, Managing Directors of the Fund, Michael 
Camdessus and Horst Kohler, further emphasized the IMF’s role in economic growth 
(Hardoy, 2003).                                         
A huge number of studies focused on the subject whether the IMF undeniably 
influences economic growth (Bird, 2001). Three methods of evaluation have been 
used. The so-called before–after analysis looks at economic growth before the IMF 
program has been agreed and the growth levels after the program has concluded. 
Differences in value are then considered a result of the program. Obviously, this 
method is not perfect, because participation in IMF programs is usually the 
consequence of a crisis. Fund’s effects are probably judged too negatively, when 
referring all changes in growth over the program period to the IMF (Dreher, 2006).                                                                 
Another method employed was to compare growth rates in countries participating in 
the program with the growth of countries in a control group (“with–without 
approach” (Dreher 2006, p. 4)). External shocks affecting both groups of countries 
would not bias the results. The main problem with this approach, of course, is finding 
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a proper control group of countries. Theoretically, we should consider a control-
group country for each program country analysed. Loan programs are not randomly 
distributed over member countries, but are selected from countries with certain 
characteristics (Dreher 2006). As Santaella (1996) has observed, the initial position of 
program countries is significantly different from non-program countries. This method 
could not consider the most important characteristic - the decision to participate in an 
IMF program in the first place, even if the control group would be selected based on 
such criteria as economic indicators. However, according to Atoyan and Conway 
(2005), this approach could work and countries could be matched according to the 
probability of being under a program. 
The third method consists of a regression analysis - used by most recent studies. In 
this approach, we take into account the endogeneity of the IMF-related variables. 
Moreover, it appears to be the best method, considering the type of data used. 
However, to solve the endogeneity problem is not a simple task. Most of the earlier 
studies have not put a lot of effort in solving this problem. More recent studies, like 
Przeworski and Vreeland (2000) or Barro & Lee (2005), consider this problem. In 
2006, Axel Dreher published a paper, which is the only one that adequately separates 
the effects of the advice provided by IMF and compliance with conditionality from 
financial support allocated. Even though the paper of Hutchison and Noy (2003), 
could match a part of the compliance with conditionality effect and negative stimulus 
due to increased budgetary leeway. 
In our thesis, we will use the third approach to identify the connectivity between the 
economic output, inflation and IMF loan programs. 
2.4. How can the IMF influence the economic growth 
International Monetary Fund has a multitude of channels to influence economic 
outcomes. First channel is the program approval, which is clearly associated with a 
particular amount of funds. This credit does not have a very clear impact. In theory, 
IMF financial support is supposed to help fix the economy. However, in practice the 
result might be exactly opposite: loan received from the IMF increases governments’ 
time to come up with a solution to the crisis, thus it creates a false feeling that 
Characteristics of the IMF  15 
 
problem was solved and, in the end, it reduces the incentive to reform (Boockmann 
and Dreher 2003). As a consequence to this fact, governments carry on with 
inappropriate policies longer than they would in different circumstances (Bandow, 
1994). According to a study by Veiga (2005), participation in IMF loan programs 
during high inflation periods reduces the probability of stabilization, while the effect 
of credit allocated is ambiguous and depends on the timing of disbursements. 
Another path of affecting growth is the case when availability of Fund’s loan may 
negatively affect economic policy even before credit has been allocated. Moral 
hazard hypothesis states that IMF lending may be understood as a subsidized income 
insurance against shocks that could harm the economy (Vaubel 1983). „The 
insurance” cover encourages the potential receivers of funds to not bother with 
preventive measures against such problems. We can find a considerable amount of 
evidence that the balance of payments problems of borrowers from the IMF have 
been largely of their own creation and that economic benchmark results during inter-
program years have been declining as the number of past programs increased. In his 
paper, Evrensel (2002) shows that budget deficits, inflation rates, and domestic credit 
are higher in the second inter-program period compared with the first. Conway 
(1994) claims that participation in IMF programs is more likely to happen again the 
more frequently the country had participated in the past. Dreher and Vaubel (2004a) 
showed that economic policy is undeniably more expansive in countries with higher 
IMF loans available, when compared with the country’s undrawn quota with the 
Fund. If the hypothesis that IMF induces moral hazard and bad economic policy is 
true, then the effect of all this would be the reduced growth (Dreher 2006).                      
Third, the IMF imposes conditionality to its loan programs. These conditions contain 
methods and instruments, which are believed to be adequate to achieve sustainable 
growth and solve the crisis. Nevertheless, we hear frequent complaints addressed to 
IMF conditionality, which is described as ”one size fits all” and inappropriate in most 
cases (Bird 1986, Feldstein 1998 and Meltzer 2005). If these statements are true, then 
enforcement of those conditions could reduce growth. In addition, non-compliance 
with conditionality and program interruptions are frequent. If Fund’s conditions are 
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not implemented and programs interrupted, then certainly, they could not possibly 
have any impact on the performance of the economy (Dreher 2006). 
A fourth way of the Fund to influence growth is its advisory regarding policy 
implementation or the so-called „technical assistance” (Boockmann and Dreher 
2003). IMF’s recommendations are often publicly discussed and may have a long run 
effect in influencing politics (Killick 1994, p. 156). Fischer (2001) argues that one of 
the IMF’s main added value to reforms is that it is constantly promoting a particular 
way to economic policymaking. Thus, in the long term the IMF’s impact can reach 
farther than recent effects of conditions and finance. Therefore, Fund’s advice to 
policymakers can have a positive effect on growth regardless of policy conditionality 
(Dreher 2006). 
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3. Methodology 
This chapter consists of three sections. In the first part, we formulate our hypotheses 
regarding the interaction between parameters chosen in the dataset. In the second 
section, we provide a brief description of the panel dataset, together with an 
explanation for each variable included in it. In the last part of the chapter, we will 
introduce our analytical models and describe how we will apply them in this thesis. 
3.1. Hypotheses 
Given the characteristics of the International Monetary Fund, which we described 
earlier, we focused our analysis on how loan programs affect two of the most 
important economic benchmarks – GDP growth and Inflation rate. In addition, to 
shed some light over the problem regarding influence of major shareholders during 
the decision-making process, we will have a look at how the IMF Quotas are 
affecting the access of member countries to larger funds.  
Inspired by the persistent attention on economic growth since the moment 
organization was founded back in the ‘70s of the XX century (Hardoy 2003), we 
want to add a fresh view on how the Fund’s programs influenced the growth rate of 
GDP. Therefore, our first point of discussion will be the influence exercised by the 
amounts drawn from the General Resources Account of the International Monetary 
Fund on the rate of economic growth. The recent global financial crisis caused quite 
some shock and put to a test the robustness of national economies. It significantly 
increased the “demand” for IMF’s loans during 2006 and 2009. Thus, we have more 
data to be included in our thesis, as you can see in the figure below. 
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Figure 1: Number of countries engaged in IMF loan programs 1970-2013 
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on data from World Bank 
Our assumption here is that Fund’s programs create a positive stimulus for countries 
in the low-income category, by offering the chance to implement reforms at a very 
low cost of financing.
4
 When it comes to countries in the middle-income group, we 
expect that the effect on the growth rate of GDP will be less positive, assuming 
Solow’s Law of Diminishing Returns is relevant in this case. 
In light of results of previous studies (Barro & Lee, 2005), which argue that countries 
with larger share of IMF’s Quotas tend to receive more sizable loans, we decided to 
factor in the more recent data and replicate the analysis using a system GMM 
estimator. In this part of the thesis, our discussion will focus on whether a bigger 
share in the International Monetary Fund can lead to larger loans. As we can see in 
Figure 2, the membership structure of the Fund has changed quite significantly since 
1970. The share of countries like USA, UK, France, Belgium, Australia and Canada 
has decreased, while countries like China, Russia and Saudi Arabia have expanded 
their Quotas contribution.                                                                                     
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Figure 2: Share of IMF quotas in 1970 vs 2013 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on data from World Bank 
In the last part of our analysis, we will have a look on the level of Consumer Price 
Index and how it reacts to IMF loans. Factors driving the CPI level, up or down, vary 
for each country. Some countries rely heavily on imports of consumer products, 
while others are driven by the public sector activity (with government spending being 
the main factor sustaining economic activity, and subsequently the level of inflation). 
In moments of crisis, Inflation level is one of the “barometers” used to signal 
problems arising within an economy. It is an indicator that can go either way. For this 
reason, we will try to identify if engaging in a loan program from IMF can affect the 
level of prices. Our assumption is that it has an upward effect on the level of 
consumer prices.                             
This being said we proceed to describe our data. 
3.2. Data description 
The data sample we use is an unbalanced panel of 186 countries that covers the time 
span from 1970 to 2013, represented in a long format.
5
 For some countries or periods, 
we have missing observations. The number of observations is based on our choice of 
instruments selected.  
                                                          
5
 In the long format, each row is one time point per subject. Therefore, each subject (country) will have 
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The full list of countries selected for this study is stated in Appendix C: Data 
Diagnostics. The initial list of 214 countries, available in the data bank, was reduced 
due to low number of observations. The original set consists of observations with 
annual periodicity, while the dataset used has a five-year periodicity (nine time-
periods) for each variable. We are using them in order to be able to distinguish 
between the long and short term effects of explanatory variables. The data sources for 
the observations employed in this thesis are World Bank’s “World Development 
Indicators” and “Worldwide Governance Indicators” databases. Most of the 
instruments, included in the set, are taken from the mentioned sources, while the 
author calculated the others. After a first glance at the dataset, we can identify a series 
of missing observations in the time span 1970-1990 for the “Eastern Bloc” countries, 
with a few exceptions.       
We categorize our dataset into three groups: indicators of Macroeconomic 
environment, Governance indicators and dummy variables for income and quotas 
classification. First group includes standard macroeconomic variables as GDP growth 
rate, GDP per capita, Inflation, FDI; together with IMF loan size, IMF quotas and a 
dummy for countries with Large IMF quotas. To calibrate the effect of the population 
and economy size, that might distort the results in some cases (like China, India or 
USA), we adjusted our variables by dividing them by GDP or midyear population.   
 GDP growth rate                                                                                    
GDP growth rate is the main instrument for measuring the performance of an 
economy. According to World Bank data, this variable is defined as the annual 
percentage growth rate of GDP based on constant local currency. When adjusted for 
the size of population, this variable can represent the increase of the standard of 
living in a country. It is aggregated based on constant 2005 U.S. dollars. 
 GDP per capita                                                                                               
This variable represents a ratio that measures the average income per person in a 
country. It is also used as a proxy of standard of living. According to the definition 
from World Bank, GDP is the sum of all gross value added by all resident producers 
in the economy, together with taxes on products, minus subsidies that were not 
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included in the value of the products. GDP per capita is calculated by dividing the 
gross domestic product by midyear population of the country. Data is represented in 
current US dollars (for the year 2014). In our econometric analysis, we will use a 
logarithmic transformation of this instrument in order to make our data (that spreads 
over different orders of magnitude) more symmetrical.                                                                  
 Inflation rate                                                                                                                     
Inflation is measured by Consumer Price Index, an instrument that measures the 
average changes in prices paid for consumer goods and services over time. Inflation 
is also reflecting the rate of decrease (or increase) of the purchasing power of a 
currency. It is generally agreed that in the long run, inflation is caused by increases in 
the monetary supply (Trichet, 2004). This variable is represented in annual 
percentage. According to the World Bank, Inflation rate in our dataset was 
aggregated using Laspeyres formula.                                                                       
 FDI–GDP ratio 
Foreign Direct Investment instrument included in our dataset shows net inflows in the 
economy of selected countries from foreign investors, as a percentage of GDP. It 
measures the inflow of investment to get hold of at least 10% of the voting stock in a 
local business. As stated in OECD’s Benchmark Definition of Foreign Direct 
Investment (2008), this variable is often used to represent the level of attractiveness 
of an economy and competitiveness if its enterprises when compared with other 
countries. Therefore, it should show the level of a country’s economic integration 
within the global market. For this reason, we included it in our study.                                                
 IMF Loan-GDP ratio 
This is a variable created by the author based on World Bank data. It is expressed as a 
ratio of IMF purchases on the GDP. The reason behind it is to control for the size of 
the economy. Both GDP and IMF purchases are expressed in current (2014) US 
dollars. According to World Data Bank description, ”IMF purchases are total 
drawings on the General Resources Account of the IMF during the year specified, 
excluding drawings in the reserve tranche”.         
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 IMF Quotas                                                                                                                
IMF quotas is a variable that represents the share of SDR allocated to a country as a 
percentage of total amount of SDR. A certain quota is attributed to each country that 
joins IMF. It is calculated based on a formula, which takes into account economic 
size and other characteristics of a member (like openness and economic variability). 
Used as an independent variable IMF Quotas will help us measure the effect on the 
dependent resulted from a single unit change in it. In other words, we can measure 
the change in GDP growth rate if the quota increases by 1 percentage point, ceteris 
paribus.                                                                                                                      
 Large  quotas dummy                                                                                            
One of the key functions of IMF Quotas, we would like to focus on, is the voting 
power. As IMF explained, IMF quotas determines the voting power of a member 
country. Therefore, we want to measure the influence of the members with large 
quotas. This is a dummy variable that was calculated based on the IMF quotas 
indicator. We determined the 85
th
 percentile value for each period (1 year and 5 year 
periods) as a threshold between large and small quotas, and the countries with a quota 
equal or larger than the threshold have a Large Quotas value equal to one. 
Observations for countries with small quotas are equal to zero. We chose 85
th
 
percentile as a boundary on the grounds that, at the IMF, important decisions are 
approved with a special majority of 85% of the votes.      
Figure 3: 85th percentile threshold for IMF quotas – yearly data 
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Second group of variables consists of the following indicators from the World Bank’s 
Worldwide Governance Indicators database: Control of Corruption, Government 
Effectiveness, Rule of Law and Voice & Accountability. These instruments are 
represented as estimates, with values from -2.5 to 2.5. According to World Bank, 
these estimates exhibit the country’s result on the aggregate indicator. 
 Control of Corruption                                                                                              
According to World Bank, Control of Corruption captures perceptions of the 
magnitude to which public power is used for private gain, starting from light form of 
corruption and ending with the so-called ”state capture” by private interests 
(Kaufmann 2010). Lower values, closer to -2.5, indicate a higher level of perceived 
corruption. While a high estimate, closer to 2.5, denotes a lower level of perceived 
corruption.                        
 Government Effectiveness                                                                                        
According to the World Bank, ”Government Effectiveness captures perceptions of 
the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its 
independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such 
policies” (Kaufmann 2010). A higher value of this indicator, closer to 2.5, is denoting 
a higher quality of services provided by the government. 
 Rule of Law                                                                                                                   
Rule of Law is capturing the degree of confidence in and acceptance of the society 
rules, enforced by the government and its representatives (Kaufmann, 2010). Like for 
the other two indicators in this series, a higher value will suggest a higher confidence 
in the existing legislative system and the way the law is applied. 
 Voice & Accountability                                   
We included Voice & Accountability indicator as a proxy for democratic freedoms 
and civil rights. It is the best representation of the people’s perception regarding the 
ability to participate in elections, as well as freedom of association, freedom of 
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expression, and a free mass media (Kaufmann 2010). It is also represented as an 
estimate, as the other instruments in this group. A higher value of the estimate (closer 
to 2.5) represents a perception of a stronger enforcement of civil rights in the country. 
The third group is composed of the following dummy variables: Low Income, Middle 
Income and High Income. These indicators, created by the author based on World 
Bank’s panel data on income level of economies, are equal to one if the country 
belongs to that income level; and zero otherwise. Assigning countries based on the 
level of income is done based on GNI per capita indicator, which is calculated using 
the World Bank’s Atlas Method (World Bank Data: Country and Lending Groups). 
According to the data on GNI per capita for 2013, countries with a GNI per capita of 
$1 045 or less, are considered Low Income countries, while High Income are those 
with a per capita income more than $12 746. All the other countries are in the Middle 
Income category. In our regressions, we will include only the Low and Middle 
Income indicators to avoid the situation of having a perfect multicollinearity. Another 
reason why we are deliberately dropping the High Income dummy is that, along the 
history of IMF programs, there were not many cases of loans provided to high-
income economies. 
Table 1: Summary statistics of variables- full dataset 
VARIABLES 
(1) 









Country 1674 93.5 53.70884 1 186 
Time 1674 5 2.58276 1 9 
GDP growth 1467 3.759595 4.46805 -42.4511 56.69554 
Ln(GDP per cap) 1471 7.663661 1.624375 4.160078 11.94554 
Inflation 1250 35.10739 258.0291 -5.53127 6424.988 
FDI-GDP ratio 1336 3.297604 6.141583 -17.5077 132.0772 
Loan-GDP ratio 917 0.004603 0.010672 0 0.210228 
Quotas 1420 0.629705 1.867381 0.000774 23.79395 
Large quotas 1674 0.125448 0.331325 0 1 
Contr. of Corruption 733 -0.018 0.99221 -1.9785 2.51277 
Voice & Account. 744 -0.02275 0.981966 -2.19359 1.711144 
Gov. Effectiveness 733 -0.01821 0.975082 -1.92796 2.252287 
Rule of Law 744 -0.03371 0.976631 -2.17072 1.961363 
Low Income 1674 0.391876 0.488315 0 1 
Middle Income 1674 0.452808 0.497917 0 1 
High Income 1674 0.155317 0.362315 0 1 
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Notes: This table represents the summary statistics for all variables included in the dataset. Country 
indicator represents the 186 countries included in the dataset. Time represents the 9 time periods of 5-
year average: 1970-1974, 1975-1979, 1980-1984, 1985-1989, 1990-1994, 1995-1999, 2000-2004, 
2005-2009, 2010-2013. 
When checking if our data is stationary we can choose from a wide range of tests, 
like Levin-Lin-Chu (2002), Harris-Tzavalis (1999), Breitung test (2000), Im-Pesaran-
Shin (2003), Fisher-type test (Choi 2001) of Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) and 
Hadri Lagrange Multiplier test (2000) (Stata manual: xtunitroot). Our choice fell on 
Fisher-type ADF test, seeing as it can be used in case of unbalanced panels, as is our 
case. The null hypothesis for this test is presence of unit root in all panels, hence the 
variable is not stationary. 
When testing our full sample (see results in Table 14 in Appendix C) we identified 
several non-stationary variables: Ln(GDP per. cap.), FDI-GDP ratio, Large Quotas, 
Low Income and Middle Income. Their p-value of Inverse Normal statistic (Z) is 
higher that 0.05, hence we cannot reject the null hypothesis. The rest of the regressors 
are stationary at a 5% level of statistical significance. We transform our Foreign 
Direct Investment regressor using natural logarithm, which makes it stationary, as 
you can see in table below. Ln(GDP per. cap.) variable will be droped as it is higly 
correlated
6
 with other two regressors, as we will demonstrate below. Regarding our 








                                                          
6
 One possible explanation is Spurious correlation, since correlated variables are also non-stationary. 
Our theory is confirmed after we include a drift term in ADF, which makes them stationary. 
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Table 2: Testing for Unit Root using Fisher test (with lag 0) - reduced sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES No. of 
panels 
Avg no. of 
periods 
Z  Z: p-value 
GDP growth 186 7.89 -20.793 0.0000 
Ln(GDP per cap) 185 7.95 3.027 0.9988 
Inflation 173 7.23 -19.283 0.0000 
Ln(Inflation) 173 7.15 -5.210 0.0000 
Ln(FDI-GDP ratio) 181 7.07 -9.163 0.0000 
Loan-GDP ratio 117 7.84 -9.61 0.0000 
Ln(Loan-GDP ratio) 108 5.30 -5.564 0.0000 
Quotas 179 7.93 -18.924 0.0000 
Large quotas 186 9 -0.137 0.4456 
Contr. of Corruption 184 3.98 -15.489 0.0000 
Voice & Account. 186 4 -16.507 0.0000 
Gov. Effectiveness 184 3.98 -8.213 0.0000 
Rule of Law 186 4 -10.558 0.0000 
Low Income 186 9 3.100 0.9990 
Middle Income 186 9 3.866 0.9999 
Notes: This table represents the output from the Unit Root testing using Fisher-type ADF. Results from 
testing the full dataset is represented in Table 14 in Appendix C. As we described above, some 
variables were transformed in order to make them stationary: natural logarithm was applied to FDI-
GDP ratio; while other instruments were dropped: Government Effectiveness, Rule of Law, High 
Income dummy, Ln(GDP per cap). 
During the pre-estimation stage, we tested the correlation (see Appendix E: 
Correlation matrix) between our variables and we discovered that we have several 
cases of strong correlation in our set. First, we notice the strong correlation of 
Ln(GDP per. cap.) with the Worldwide Governance Indicators: Control of 
Corruption (correlation coefficient 0.7718), Government Effectiveness (0.8181), Rule 
of Law (0.7855) and Voice & Accountability (0.6437). This instrument also has a 
strong negative correlation with Low Income dummy variable (correlation coefficient 
-0.79). Second, Middle Income and Low Income dummies are highly correlated with 
each other (-0.7302). Third, our Worldwide Governance Indicators are highly 
correlated between themselves: Control of Corruption with Government Effectiveness 
(0.9371), with Rule of Law (0.9349), with Voice & Accountability (0.7668); 
Government Effectiveness with Rule of Law (0.9304) and with Voice & 
Accountability (0.7748); and, ultimately, Rule of Law with Voice & Accountability 
(0.8293). 
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When testing for collinearity, using Collin command in Stata, we detected the 
presence of multicollinearity between our variables (see Table 15 and Table 16 in 
Appendix C: Data Diagnostics). Our preliminary regression trials, using Arellano-
Bover/Blundell-Bond method, showed that Low Income dummy variable is dropped 
because of collinearity. We suspect that this regressor, together with Middle Income, 
form a perfect linear combination. We are not able to replace them due to lack of 
instruments, which can be a substitute. Therefore, we will run two separate 
regressions where we will analyze the effect of IMF programs on countries, which 
are part of these two income categories. We also decided to drop GDP per capita 
indicator, due to detected correlation with other instruments and its insignificance at a 
95% confidence level. High correlation between the WGI explanatory variables 
forced us to drop two of them, with the highest VIF: Government Effectiveness and 
Rule of Law. A high VIF value of these two could imply that they are redundant, in 
combination with Contr. of Corruption and Voice & Accountability. Our assumption 
seems to be true when we look at collinearity diagnostics results after reducing our 
data set (see Table 3 and Table 4), with Mean VIF value closer to one.
7 Nonetheless, 
we still have correlation present between Contr. of Corruption and Voice & 
Accountability, fact confirmed by the high VIF level. Our solution to fix this problem 
is to include these variables separately in our regressions. We detect a similar 
problem with Quotas and Large quotas, when we look at the Correlation matrix from 
Stata (Appendix E: Correlation matrix) - these indicators are strongly correlated. The 
high VIF values for these two instruments confirm this fact. Therefore, we will drop 






                                                          
7
 According to Kutner (2004), a Mean Variance Inflation Factor larger than one is a sign of strong 
multicollinearity.  
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Table 3: Collinearity Diagnostics – reduced dataset (incl. Middle Income) 
Variable VIF SQRT VIF Tolerance R- Squared 
Inflation 1.03 1.01 0.9736 0.0264 
Ln(FDI-GDP ratio) 1.09 1.04 0.9159 0.0841 
Loan-GDP ratio 1.05 1.02 0.9543 0.0457 
Quotas 3.05 1.75 0.3279 0.6721 
Large quotas 2.95 1.72 0.3385 0.6615 
Contr. of Corruption 1.93 1.39 0.518 0.482 
Voice & Account. 1.94 1.39 0.5165 0.4835 
Middle Income 1.39 1.18 0.7203 0.2797 
Mean VIF 1.8 
   Notes: Variance Inflation Factor, or VIF, measures the degree of inflation of variance of the estimated 
coefficients as compared to the case when variables are not linearly related (Kutner, 2005). A VIF 
value larger than 10 is an indicator of multicollinearity. In addition to that, Squared VIF reveals the 
degree of ”inflation” of the standard error for the instrument’s coefficient, compared to the event when 
the variable were not correlated with another one, in the data set. 
 
Table 4: Collinearity Diagnostics – reduced dataset (incl. Low Income) 
Variable VIF SQRT VIF Tolerance R- Squared 
Inflation 1.03 1.01 0.9736 0.0264 
Ln(FDI-GDP ratio) 1.09 1.04 0.9159 0.0841 
Loan-GDP ratio 1.05 1.02 0.9543 0.0457 
Quotas 3.05 1.75 0.3279 0.6721 
Large quotas 2.95 1.72 0.3385 0.6615 
Contr. of Corruption 1.93 1.39 0.518 0.482 
Voice & Account. 1.94 1.39 0.5165 0.4835 
Low Income 1.39 1.18 0.7203 0.2797 
Mean VIF 1.8 
   Notes: Variance Inflation Factor, or VIF, measures the degree of inflation of variance of the estimated 
coefficients as compared to the case when variables are not linearly related (Kutner, 2005). A VIF 
value larger than 10 is an indicator of multicollinearity. In addition to that, Squared VIF reveals the 
degree of ”inflation” of the standard error for the instrument’s coefficient, compared to the event when 
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The following table stipulates the list of all variables included in our empirical 
analysis, including the operated transformation. 
 






Consumer Price Index five-year 
average data, which reflects the 
percentage change in the cost of 





Foreign Direct Investment five-year 
average data, which reflects direct 
investment equity flows, as a 







Five-year average data, which 
reflects IMF purchases as a 






IMF Quota share for each country 
represented in five-year average data. 





Dummy variable for countries with a 
quota larger than 85
th
 percentile of 
IMF Quota share. 







Control of Corruption indicator 
represented as five-year average 
estimate 
Stationary (if used 
separately from 





Voice and Accountability indicator 
represented as five-year average 
estimate 








Dummy variable for countries with a 
GNI per capita between $1045 and 
$12746 
Stationary (if used 
separately from 




Dummy variable for countries with a 
GNI per capita lower than $1045. 
Stationary (if used 
separately from 




As we already mentioned, we applied logarithmic transformation to Foreign Direct 
Investment instrument in order to make it stationary. Other than that, the remaining 
variables are already stationary.                                                                                                                     
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3.3. Analytical Model 
As we already mentioned above, we use a panel data set. This type of data has 
significant advantage over cross-section or time-series data when we are trying to 
learn about economic processes. Panel data analysis allows us to study these 
processes while taking into consideration both the dynamic effects (which are not 
detectable in cross sections) as well as the heterogeneity across countries. Therefore, 
we need a more complicated model to achieve consistent and efficient estimators.                                                                                                      
The most commonly used techniques for regression analysis with longitudinal data 
are the following: Pooled regression, the Fixed Effects model and the Random 
Effects model. To determine which method is appropriate to be used in our 
regression, we take into consideration their underlying assumptions and specifics.                                                            
According to Greene (2012), the fundamental modelling framework for this type of 
data has the following form  




𝑖𝛼 + 𝑖𝑡 (3.1) 
 = 𝑥′𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝑖𝑡 (3.2) 
where 𝑥𝑖𝑡 consists of K regressors and does not include a constant term. 𝑧
′
𝑖𝛼 captures 
the heterogeneity, where 𝑧𝑖 includes a constant term and a group of variables which 
may be either observed or unobserved. If we have an observed 𝑧𝑖 for all countries in 
the dataset, then our model can be considered a linear model and we can use OLS. 
Otherwise, when 𝑧𝑖 is unobserved, we have to use different methods of regression. 
We have to take into account that in most cases the individual effect is unobserved, 
and using OLS will lead to inconsistency of the coefficients due to the disregard of 
the time and individual difference between observations. Hence, Pooled Regression 
model does not fit our data well enough. Greene (2012) also suggests that a consistent 
and efficient estimation depends on our correct understanding of the assumptions 
about the unobserved effects. One of them is the strict exogeneity assumption for the 
explanatory variables, which in other words means that disturbances should be 
uncorrelated with independent variables in every period.                                                                                        
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 𝐸[ 𝑖𝑡|𝑥𝑖1, 𝑥𝑖2, … , 𝑥𝑖𝑛] = 0 (3.3) 
Another assumption deals with heterogeneity, i.e. mean independence assumption. It 
asserts that unobserved effects should not be correlated with other explanatory 
variables included in the regression.         
 𝐸[𝑐𝑖|𝑥𝑖1, 𝑥𝑖2, … , 𝑥𝑖𝑛] = 𝛼 (3.4) 
 
This assumption is the basis for the random effects model. 
As we already mentioned Population Averaged model cannot be used to yield 
consistent and efficient estimators. OLS estimates will be inconsistent due to 
heterogeneity that varies across countries. The problem of this approach is the fact 
that underlying assumptions for OLS are less likely to be fulfilled. First differences 
method is another approach that can be used. According to Greene (2012), an 
advantage of this method is that it removes the latent heterogeneity. A big 
disadvantage, except that it eliminates time-invariant instruments, is that this 
approach is suitable only for two-period panels.                                                                     
The Fixed Effects model originates from the assumption that the omitted effects, 𝑐𝑖, 
in the general model (3.2) are correlated with the included variables: 
 𝐸[𝑐𝑖|𝑋𝑖] = ℎ(𝑋𝑖) (3.5) 
 
Even though we can identify some group-specific effects, this model has a major 
issue: we cannot estimate the coefficients for the time-invariant terms. It is because 
these variables are absorbed in the constant term.                                                                                    
Random Effects model is used in the scenario when the unobserved effects, 𝑧𝑖, are 
uncorrelated with variables already in the model. According to Greene (2012), this 
approach is relevant only if cross-sectional units are selected from a large population. 
The same source states that, while this model is in a considerable way reducing the 
estimated parameters, there is a chance that estimators will prove inconsistent, if our 
assumption is incorrect.  
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Therefore, we chose to use a dynamic model to analyze our panel data set, namely 
Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond dynamic panel estimators. According to Roodman 
(2009), the estimator was created for ”situations with: a) “small T, large N” panels, 
meaning few time periods and many individuals; b) a linear functional relationship; 
c) one left-hand-side variable that is dynamic, depending on its own past realizations; 
d) independent variables that are not strictly exogenous, meaning they are correlated 
with past and possibly current realizations of the error; e) fixed individual effects; and 
f) heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within individuals but not across them”. The 
Arellano–Bover/Blundell–Bond (AB/BB) uses GMM and transforms all regressors, 
by method of differentiation. When compared to Arellano Bover (1995), AB/BB 
estimator is allowing one extra assumption: the first differences of the explanatory 
variables are uncorrelated with the fixed effects. This assumption grants us more 
efficiency by introducing more variables in our regression model.                                                                 
If we rewrite our general model, as specified in equation (3.2), as a dynamic panel 
data model, it will have the following structure 
 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑥
′
𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝛿𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝑖𝑡 (3.6) 
 
The underlying assumptions of this model are: 
a) Homoscedasticity: 𝐸[ 𝑖𝑡
2 |𝑋𝑖, 𝑐𝑖] = 𝜎𝜀
2 
b) Strict exogeneity: 𝐸[ 𝑖𝑡|𝑋𝑖, 𝑐𝑖] = 0 
c) Non-Autocorrelation: 𝐸[ 𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑠|𝑋𝑖, 𝑐𝑖] = 0 if 𝑡 ≠ 𝑠 
d) Uncorrelated observations: 𝐸[ 𝑖𝑡 𝑗𝑠|𝑋𝑖, 𝑐𝑖, 𝑋𝑗 , 𝑐𝑗] = 0 for 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 and for all 
𝑡 and 𝑠, 
where the rows of the T × K data matrix 𝑋𝑖 are 𝑥
′
𝑖𝑡, according to Greene (2012). 
In the following sections, we will describe our regression models in detail, based on 
the hypotheses we want to test. These models are based on some of the previous 
papers published on the same topic (Barro & Lee, 2005; Dreher, 2006). We restricted 
the number of variables, previously used in the mentioned papers, and included new 
instruments, like Contr. of Corruption, Voice & Accountability, Government 
Effectiveness, Large Quotas, Low and Middle Income. 
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3.3.1. Low and Middle Income countries and the 
effect of the IMF loan programs 
The first hypothesis we want to test in our study is whether there is a negative or 
positive effect of IMF loan programs on the economic growth of countries over the 
period from 1970 to 2013. We will focus on the Low and Middle Income countries. A 
majority of the studies on this topic have stated that, overall, the growth rates are 
decreasing after engaging in an IMF loan program. 
Our assumption for the Low Income countries is that engagement in a Fund’s loan 
program is affecting the GDP growth in a positive way. We base our assumption on 
the Law of Diminishing returns and Poverty Trap theory (Figure 4 in Appendix D) 
conditional on whether these countries will succeed in realizing “the Big Push” and 
escape “the Poverty Trap”. For Middle Income countries, we assume that Fund’s 
loans will also have a positive effect on the growth of the gross domestic product, but 
smaller than the one for Low Income borrowers. As a possible explanation can be 
either the insufficient loan amount to “push” the economy to a new equilibrium or the 
lack of a “High income equilibrium”. 
In addition to the Loan-GDP ratio, we include IMF Quotas variable in order to 
capture the effect of the voting power exercised by a member country within the 
Fund.
8
 Our assumption is that a larger quota will trigger a lower rate of economic 
growth, since a large quota translates into resources allocated to IMF instead of being 
invested back into the national economy. 
A fact to be noted here is that for Quotas, Contr. of Corruption, Voice & 
Accountability, Low Income and Middle Income we will not include their first lag in 
our models, because the fitted coefficients of these variables and their lags are highly 
correlated, as we noticed in our initial regression analysis. 
For testing our hypothesis, we will use the following models: 
                                                          
8
 According to Barro &Lee (2005), IMF Quotas are not always adjusted to the level of GDP. His OLS 
regression of IMF Quotas on the total GDP and per capita GDP has identified that there are countries 
over-weighted on quotas, like Russia, UK and France; and countries under-weighted on quotas, like 
South Korea and China.  
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(1) 𝑌𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑌𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑛(𝐹𝐷𝐼/
𝐺𝐷𝑃)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑛(𝐹𝐷𝐼/𝐺𝐷𝑃)𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛/𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛/𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 +
𝛽8𝑄𝑢𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐶𝑟𝑝𝑡𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐿𝑜𝑤𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 
(2) 𝑌𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑌𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑛(𝐹𝐷𝐼/
𝐺𝐷𝑃)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑛(𝐹𝐷𝐼/𝐺𝐷𝑃)𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛/𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛/𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 +
𝛽8𝑄𝑢𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑉&𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐿𝑜𝑤𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 
(3) 𝑌𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑌𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑛(𝐹𝐷𝐼/
𝐺𝐷𝑃)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑛(𝐹𝐷𝐼/𝐺𝐷𝑃)𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛/𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛/𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 +
𝛽8𝑄𝑢𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐶𝑟𝑝𝑡𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑒𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 
(4) 𝑌𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑌𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑛(𝐹𝐷𝐼/
𝐺𝐷𝑃)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑛(𝐹𝐷𝐼/𝐺𝐷𝑃)𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛/𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛/𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 +
𝛽8𝑄𝑢𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑉&𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑒𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 
3.3.2. Country’s quota at IMF and loan size 
Another question that we want to find an answer to is whether the size of a country’s 
quota can affect Fund’s decisions. We wonder if a country can exercise its influence 
in tipping the scale in favor or against granting a larger amount of financial aid.          
Edwards (2001) states that influence, represented by member’s quotas, reduced the 
probability of loan program suspension. According to Barro & Lee (2005), “IMF 
loans are more likely to exist and to be larger in size when countries have larger 
quotas, more nationals on the IMF staff, and are more connected politically and 
economically to the United States and the major Western European countries”. We 
expect the same effect in our results. Our analysis will take into consideration the 
effect of the quotas on the loan amount drawn from IMF. 
In this part of our analysis, together with our instruments we will add their first lags, 
except for Quotas, Contr. of Corruption and Voice & Accountability. These three 
variables are strongly correlated with their first lags, according to our preliminary 
regression analysis. We also noticed that initially our models were misspecified, 
which indicated that we need to rethink our model. Hence, we replaced the dependent 
variable with its natural logarithm. Our regression models will have the following 
form:  
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(1) 𝐿𝑛(𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛/𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡) = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑌𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑌𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽4𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑛(𝐹𝐷𝐼/𝐺𝐷𝑃)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑛(𝐹𝐷𝐼/𝐺𝐷𝑃)𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝐿𝑛(𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛/
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝛽8𝑄𝑢𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐶𝑟𝑝𝑡𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 
(2) 𝐿𝑛(𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛/𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡) = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑌𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑌𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽4𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑛(𝐹𝐷𝐼/𝐺𝐷𝑃)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑛(𝐹𝐷𝐼/𝐺𝐷𝑃)𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝐿𝑛(𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛/
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝛽8𝑄𝑢𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑉&𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 
3.3.3. IMF loan programs and their effect on Inflation 
level 
In this part of our thesis, we will have a look on the influence of IMF’s programs on 
the rate of Inflation. Our assumption is that Funds’ financial aid is providing an 
additional upward pressure on the level of prices and leads to currency crises, which, 
subsequently, has a negative effect on the consumers by increasing the price of 
imports and debt denominated in foreign currency.
9
 Joyce, J. P. (2004), argues that 
our evidence of a systematic effect on inflation is insufficient. On the other hand, 
Steinwand and Stone (2008), state that “credible IMF programs can lower inflation 
levels”. Therefore, using the available data, we will test if the IMF loans are raising 
the inflation level. 
As in Section 3.3.1, our regression models will not include first lag for the following 
variables:  Quotas, Contr. of Corruption, Voice & Accountability, Low Income and 
Middle Income. This is also caused by the correlation between the fitted coefficients 
of variables and their lags. 
Our initial regression trials were showing us that our models are misspecified, which 
indicates that we need to rethink our model. Hence, we will use the natural logarithm 
of Inflation as dependent variable. Furthermore, in our models, we include only GDP 
growth, without its first lag, in order to ensure that overidentifying moment 
conditions are valid, which will allow us to obtain consistent estimates. 
We use the following four models: 
                                                          
9
 According to a study by Axel Dreher and Stefanie Walter (2010) on effect of IMF loans on the 
likelihood and outcome of currency crises. 
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(1) 𝐿𝑛(𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑡) = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑌𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑛(𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝛽3𝐿𝑛(𝐹𝐷𝐼/𝐺𝐷𝑃)𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽4𝐿𝑛(𝐹𝐷𝐼/𝐺𝐷𝑃)𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛/𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛/𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝑄𝑢𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽8𝐿𝑜𝑤𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐶𝑟𝑝𝑡𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 
(2) 𝐿𝑛(𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑡) = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑌𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑛(𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝛽3𝐿𝑛(𝐹𝐷𝐼/𝐺𝐷𝑃)𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽4𝐿𝑛(𝐹𝐷𝐼/𝐺𝐷𝑃)𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛/𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛/𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝑄𝑢𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽8𝐿𝑜𝑤𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑉&𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 
(3) 𝐿𝑛(𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑡) = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑌𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑛(𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝛽3𝐿𝑛(𝐹𝐷𝐼/𝐺𝐷𝑃)𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽4𝐿𝑛(𝐹𝐷𝐼/𝐺𝐷𝑃)𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛/𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛/𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝑄𝑢𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽8𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑒𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐶𝑟𝑝𝑡𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 
(4) 𝐿𝑛(𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑡) = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑌𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑛(𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝛽3𝐿𝑛(𝐹𝐷𝐼/𝐺𝐷𝑃)𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽4𝐿𝑛(𝐹𝐷𝐼/𝐺𝐷𝑃)𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛/𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛/𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝑄𝑢𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽8𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑒𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑉&𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 
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4. Empirical Results 
Before running a regression using a dynamic panel data model, we employ a few 
simple panel data models (pooled OLS, Random Effect and Fixed Effect models) in 
order to get a first glimpse of our dataset. The results are presented in Table 6. The 
purpose of this exercise is to understand how our instruments behave under such 
restrictive assumptions, particularly for OLS, versus more relaxed ones, for FE and 
RE.                                                                    
Table 6: Regression results for pooled OLS, FE and RE on GDP growth 
Variable OLS FE RE 
Inflation -0.0008 -0.0318** -0.0013 
 (0.002) (0.016) (0.002) 
Ln(FDI-GDP ratio) 0.5711*** 0.8561*** 0.5855*** 
 (0.122) (0.249) (0.132) 
Loan-GDP ratio 4.7869 10.8107 2.4472 
 (10.778) (13.645) (10.162) 
Quotas 1.1654*** 1.0269 1.0712*** 
 (0.306) (2.552) (0.389) 
Contr. of Corruption -0.1807 0.3273 -0.3395 
 (0.276) (0.885) (0.321) 
Low Income 1.0137*** 0.0747 0.6152* 
 (0.306) (0.565) (0.337) 
_cons 2.9989*** 3.6106*** 3.1210*** 





   No. of Obs. 423 310 423 
Notes: The dependent variable is GDP growth rate over the 5-year periods 1970-1974, 1975-1979, …, 
2010-2013. The p-value is reported at a 95% confidence level, where: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
The chi2 represents the Chi-Square statistic, which shows the number of predictors in the model. 
Standard errors in parentheses. Loan-GDP ratio represents the amount of IMF loans disbursed adjusted 
for the size of the economy. FDI-GDP ratio represents the amount of Foreign Direct Investments 
adjusted for the GDP.  
As we can see, under the OLS, the majority of explanatory variables are statistically 
significant, except Inflation, Loan-GDP ratio and Contr. of Corruption. This is not 
the case with FE method, where Foreign Direct Investments is strongly significant 
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and Inflation is significant at a 95% confidence level. When using RE, except the 
constant term, we have two strongly significant parameters Ln(FDI-GDP ratio) and 
Quotas. In all three cases, the Loan-GDP ratio variable is hardly exercising any 
power over the output growth. In terms of signs of the estimated coefficients, they are 
in line with our expectations. After performing post estimation test of these 
regressions, results indicate that RE would be more consistent than FE or OLS. 
Theoretically, this illustrates the lack of linear relationship between explanatory 
variables and unit-specific effect. 
Either way, we would like to test these results using a dynamic model. It will allow 
us to introduce additional instruments, as lagged differences, which will reveal more 
information about our data, if compared with a static model. 
In the following subchapters, we are going to describe our results for each of the 
three hypotheses and their interpretations.                                                                  
Low and Middle Income countries and the effect of the IMF loan 
programs 
We modelled our panel data using the system GMM estimator, developed by 
Blundell and Bond. Our set up incorporates all the variables described in Chapter 3 
(except the ones excluded due to high correlation and multicollinearity) and their first 
lag
10
 so that we could identify whether the lagged regressor has more explanatory 
power than its current one. We declared all variables as predetermined, because we 
cannot assume strict exogeneity.  
After running separate regressions of our dynamic panel models specified above, we 




                                                          
10
 Except for the instruments that were strongly correlated with their first lag. 
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    L1. 0.0605 0.05425 0.0605 0.0543 
 (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) 
Inflation 
    --. 0.0024 0.0013 0.0024 0.0013 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
L1. -0.0012*** -0.0011*** -0.0012*** -0.0011*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ln (FDI-GDP ratio) 
    --. 1.0132*** 0.972*** 1.0132*** 0.972*** 
 (0.281) (0.279) (0.281) (0.279) 
L1. -0.2702 -0.2676 -0.2702 -0.2676 
 (0.192) (0.191) (0.192) (0.191) 
Loan-GDP ratio 
    --. 30.3909** 29.1968** 30.3909** 29.1968** 
 (13.444) (13.337) (13.444) (13.337) 
L1. 6.9023 7.8738 6.9023 7.8738 
 (8.976) (8.889) (8.976) (8.889) 
Quotas -0.9705 -0.6887 -0.9705 -0.6887 





  (0.634)  (0.634)  
Low Income 0.4322 0.4393 











   (0.529) (0.524) 
_cons 2.587*** 2.8932*** 3.0192*** 3.3325*** 
 (0.639) (0.618) (0.589) (0.551) 
chi2(10) 59.989 58.744 59.989 58.744 
df 
    No. of Obs. 397 397 397 397 
Notes: The dependent variable is GDP growth rate over the 5-year periods 1970-1974, 1975-1979, …, 
2010-2013. A system GMM estimator was applied to the panel data. GMM standard errors are in 
parentheses. The p-value is reported at a 95% confidence level, where: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** 
p<0.01. The chi2 represents the Wald Chi-Square statistic with 10 degrees of freedom and represents 
the number of predictors in the model. L1 represents the first lag of variables. Models were ordered 
according to numbering in the description of Analytical Models used. Loan-GDP ratio represents the 
amount of IMF loans disbursed adjusted for the size of the economy. FDI-GDP ratio represents the 
amount of Foreign Direct Investments adjusted for the GDP. 
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What we observe is that 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡−1, 𝐿𝑛(𝐹𝐷𝐼 − 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜)𝑡, 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛 −
𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑡, 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 and Constant term are having a significant effect on the 
growth level of the economy, while Voice & Accountability is significant at a 90% 
confidence level. A curios fact is that the first lag of the GDP growth does not affect 
the current level of the instrument in a significant matter. We should also note that 
Low Income, Middle Income and Quotas are not exercising any significant influence 
on our dependent variable. In terms of coefficient’s sign, majority are in line with our 
expectations (for 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑡−1, Inflation, Loan-GDP ratio, 𝐿𝑛(𝐹𝐷𝐼 −
𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜)𝑡, Low Inc, Voice & Accountability and Contr. of Corruption, Middle 
Inc), while Quotas and 𝐿𝑛(𝐹𝐷𝐼 − 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜)𝑡−1 are not.  
Results show that countries are benefiting from engaging in IMF loan programs - 
variable 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛 − 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑡 is both significant and positive in all four models. An 
increase of one unit in the Loan-GDP ratio will increase the GDP growth rate with 
29.2 to 30.4 percentage points, ceteris paribus. This represents the long-term effect of 
both the Conditionality and the loans provided by IMF. FDI also has a significant 
effect over the growth of economic output in the current period. Holding other 
parameters fixed, a 1 % increase in the FDI-GDP ratio will increase the GDP growth 
with 0.01 units. Past level of Inflation also proved to be significant. An increase of 
one unit in last period’s CPI will decrease the growth of output with 0.001 units, 
ceteris paribus. Results presented in the table above also suggest that an increase in 




When using estat Abond, we find no sign of serial correlation in the first-differenced 
errors, in any of the four models. We cannot reject the null hypothesis of zero 
autocorrelation at order two;
12
 hence, we cannot affirm that our models are 
misspecified. 
                                                          
11
 Regarding Voice & Account. and Contr. of Corruption, we assume that the higher the rank the more 
expensive it is for the country to keep its position. Therefore, we believe that the negative signs of the 
estimated coefficients are caused by higher expenditures for ensuring civil liberties and control of 
corruption. 
12
 We don’t take into consideration rejecting the null hypothesis at order one because the first 
difference of i.i.d. idiosyncratic will be autocorrelated, which does not mean that the model is 
misspecified. 
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Table 8: Estat Abond test result – GDP growth 
Order 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
z Prob > z z Prob > z z Prob > z z Prob > z 
1 -2.69 0.007 -2.68 0.007 -2.69 0.007 -2.68 0.007 
2 0.473 0.636 0.829 0.407 0.473 0.636 0.829 0.407 
Notes: Null hypothesis - no autocorrelation 
We also performed the Sargan test to see whether the overidentifying moment 
conditions are conclusive. The null hypothesis, of valid overidentifying restrictions, 
could not be rejected for any of the four models. Therefore, we do not need to adjust 
our models. 
Country’s quota at IMF and loan size 
The second question we want to answer in this thesis is whether the size of the Quota 
of a country can somehow influence the size of the IMF loans. As in the previous 
subchapter, we will use the system GMM estimator. 
As we can see from Table 9, except the intercept, no other variable has a significant 
impact on the size of the IMF Loans. The first lag of Loan-GDP ratio is significant at a 
90% confidence level. A one percent increase in the Loans received in previous 
period will increase the current Loan-GDP ratio with 0.16 percent, ceteris paribus. 
Hence, according to our results, we can state that the size of IMF loans is conditioned 
on the previous history of financing from IMF. 
Regarding the signs of estimated coefficients, results for Contr. of Corruption, Voice 
& Accountability, FDI-GDP ratio and GDP growth are not in line with our 
expectations. Even though they are not statistically significant, estimated coefficients 
suggest that an increase in them will decrease the size of the loans. Even though the 
estimated coefficient for lagged Quotas has a positive sign, it does not affect the size 
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Table 9: Dynamic panel estimates for IMF Loan-GDP ratio 
Variable 
Ln (Loan-GDP ratio) 
(1) 
Ln (Loan-GDP ratio) 
(2) 
Ln (Loan-GDP ratio) 
  L1. 0.1623* 0.1584* 
 (0.089) (0.089) 
GDP growth 
  --. -0.0243 -0.0155 
 (0.039) (0.039) 
L1. -0.0244 -0.0227 
 (0.025) (0.025) 
Inflation 
  --. -0.0045 -0.0011 
 (0.007) (0.007) 
L1. -0.0000 -0.0001 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Ln (FDI-GDP ratio) 
  --. -0.1587 -0.1613 
 (0.128) (0.129) 
L1. -0.1214 -0.0918 
 (0.100) (0.100) 
Quotas 0.505 0.3593 
 (0.69) (0.677) 
Contr. of Corruption -0.59 





  (0.289) 
_cons -4.7304*** -4.6164*** 
 (0.560) (0.537) 
chi2(9) 23.055 21.402 
df 
  No. of Obs. 195 195 
Notes: The dependent variable is natural logarithm of Loan-GDP ratio over the 5-year periods 1970-
1974, 1975-1979, …, 2010-2013. A system GMM estimator was applied to the panel data. GMM 
standard errors are in parentheses. The p-value is reported at a 95% confidence level, where: * p<0.1; 
** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. The chi2 represents the Wald Chi-Square statistic with 9 degrees of freedom 
and represents the number of predictors in the model. L1 represents the first lag of variables. Models 
were ordered according to numbering in the description of Analytical Models used. Loan-GDP ratio 
represents the amount of IMF loans disbursed adjusted for the size of the economy. FDI-GDP ratio 
represents the amount of Foreign Direct Investments adjusted for the GDP. 
In both cases, Sargan test output indicates that we cannot reject the fact that 
overidentifying restrictions are valid. In other words, we do not need to revise our 
model. This is the output from the test:  
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(1)    chi2(81)     =  96.924   (2) chi2(81)     =  99.647 
        Prob > chi2  =    0.1095         Prob > chi2  =    0.078 
 
No signs of serial correlation in the first-differenced errors were detected in the 
second model. For the first model, at AR(1), we cannot reject the null hypothesis at a 
95% confidence level and this is a signs that we might have autocorrelation present. 
In both cases, at AR(2), we fail to reject the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation; 
therefore, we say that our model is correctly specified.  
Table 10: Estat Abond test result – Loan-GDP ratio 
Order 
(1) (2) 
z Prob > z z Prob > z 
1 -1.713 0.0868 -1.977 0.0481 
2 -0.064 0.9494 -0.356 0.7221 
Notes: Null hypothesis - no autocorrelation 
 
IMF loan programs and their effect on Inflation level 
In this section, we aim to identify the impact of IMF programs on Consumer Price 
Index level. Our assumption is that Fund’s loans are exercising an upward pressure 
on Inflation rate. We chose to regress Low Income vs Middle Income and Contr. of 
Corruption vs Voice & Accountability separately due to relatively high correlation 
between them.  
Regression output is displayed in Table 11. 
The first aspect we notice in the output is highly significant Constant variable, first 
lag of Inflation and past and current FDI-GDP ratio. In addition to that, Contr. of 
Corruption variable is significant at a 95% confidence level. According to our 
estimated coefficients, a one percent increase in initial level of CPI will increase the 
present level of Inflation by 0.23 up to 0.24 %, holding other parameters fixed. When 
it comes to FDI, a one percent increase in current FDI-GDP ratio will increase the 
Inflation by approximately 0.38%, while a one percent increase of the same 
instrument in the past period will decrease the level of prices, in the current period, 
by circa 0.41%, ceteris paribus. Control of Corruption exercising a downward 
pressure on CPI level: a one unit increase in Contr. of Corruption will decrease 
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Inflation by 46%, ceteris paribus. In other words, enforcing anti-corruption measures 
is determining the level of prices to contract. Estimated coefficient for Voice & 
Accountability also has a negative sign, but it is not statistically significant. 











    L1. 0.2287*** 0.2359*** 0.2287*** 0.2359*** 
 (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) 
Ln(FDI-GDP ratio) 
    --. 0.3766*** 0.3796*** 0.3766*** 0.3796*** 
 (0.093) (0.094) (0.093) (0.094) 
L1. -0.4052*** -0.4083*** -0.4052*** -0.4083*** 
 (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) 
Loan-GDP ratio 
    --. 2.6506 2.7069 2.6506 2.7069 
 (4.923) (4.979) (4.923) (4.979) 
L1. 0.3942 0.7354 0.3942 0.7354 
 (2.587) (2.606) (2.587) (2.606) 
GDP growth -0.0278 -0.0258 -0.0278 -0.0258 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Quotas -0.0459 0.0528 -0.0459 0.0528 
 (0.422) (0.422) (0.422) (0.422) 
Low Income -0.1459 -0.1337 
   (0.158) (0.159)   
Contr. of Corruption -0.4632** 
 
-0.4632** 











   (0.158) (0.159) 
_cons 1.1982*** 1.2827*** 1.0523*** 1.1490*** 
 (0.207) (0.205) (0.236) (0.233) 
chi2(9) 168.556 162.270 168.556 162.270 
df 
    No. of Obs. 395 395 395 395 
Notes: The dependent variable is natural logarithm of Inflation rate over the 5-year periods 1970-1974, 
1975-1979, …, 2010-2013. A system GMM estimator was applied to the panel data. GMM standard 
errors are in parentheses. The p-value is reported at a 95% confidence level, where: * p<0.1; ** 
p<0.05; *** p<0.01. The chi2 represents the Wald Chi-Square statistic with 9 degrees of freedom and 
represents the number of predictors in the model. L1 represents the first lag of variables. Models were 
ordered according to numbering in the description of Analytical Models used. Loan-GDP ratio 
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represents the amount of IMF loans disbursed adjusted for the size of the economy. FDI-GDP ratio 
represents the amount of Foreign Direct Investments adjusted for the GDP. 
In regards to the IMF program indicator, Loan-GDP ratio, both the first lag and 
current period estimators have a positive sign. This translates into an upward pressure 
for the Inflation ration. Nevertheless, the impact of this parameter is not statistically 
significant.  
As we described in Section 3.3.3, during our preliminary regression trials, we were 
having difficulties with finding valid moment conditions. According to Arellano and 
Bond (1991), the one-step Sargan test over-rejects in the presence of 
heteroscedasticity. Therefore, we reconsidered our models and applied a natural 
logarithm transformation to the dependent variable, Inflation. We also decided to use 
a weaker definition of the models, where we include only GDP growth (without its 
first lag) and we assume it is strictly exogenous. Considering the changes applied to 
our original models, Sargan test results suggest that we cannot reject our hypothesis 
of valid overidentifying restrictions at a 90% confidence level.  
Table 12: Output from Sargan test –Ln(Inflation) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
chi2(61) 79.992  79.5509 79.992  79.5509 
Prob > chi2 0.0519  0.0555 0.0519  0.0555 
Notes: H0 = overidentifying restrictions are valid 
We believe that in order to obtain valid moment conditions at a 95% confidence level 
we will have to re-think our model in a more substantial way, by employing a 
different set of parameters, which can be a subject of further research. 
Table 13: Output from Estat Abond test – Ln(Inflation) 
Order 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
z Prob > z z Prob > z z Prob > z z Prob > z 
1 -4.14 0.00 -4.005 0.00 -4.14 0.00 -4.005 0.00 
2 0.877 0.380 0.534 0.594 0.877 0.380 0.534 0.594 
Notes: Null hypothesis - no autocorrelation 
In Table 13 above, we have the output from estat Abond test. For AR(2), we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis, of zero autocorrelation, which suggests that there is no 
evidence that our models are misspecified. 
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5. Conclusion 
The International Monetary Fund, over the years, has proved itself as a “lender of the 
last resort” for countries in economic troubles. The lack of alternative options, in 
matter of financing an unexpected budget deficit or fixing a balance of payment 
problem, has forced many governments to engage, willy-nilly, in financial assistance 
programs, without considering the effects of the conditionality, tied to the funds 
provided.                                                     
In the present study, we have examined economic performance of countries, namely 
their GDP and Inflation rate, and how IMF’s programs are affecting it. In addition to 
that, we looked at how the size of IMF Quotas contribution can influence the size of 
the loan received.  
When it comes to the total drawings on the General Resources Account of the Fund, 
our regression found significant evidence that contracting an IMF loan will increase 
the rate of GDP growth within the five-year period, but not for longer periods, as 
confirmed by the lack of statistical significant estimates for the first lag of Loan-GDP 
ratio. In other words, in the medium term IMF programs have a positive effect on the 
economic output growth. Regression estimates for Low and Middle Income variables 
confirm our expectations. Nevertheless, they are not statistically significant; hence, 
we cannot say what kind of impact Fund’s programs has on countries from each of 
these income categories. Our results contradict the previous studies, from Barro & 
Lee (2005) and Axel Dreher (2006), which found a substantial inverse relation 
between IMF loan-GDP ratio and economic growth. Our results also suggest that an 
increase in the rating for Voice & Account. or Contr. of Corruption will decrease the 
GDP growth in a significant way. 
When it comes to the share of Quotas at IMF and its influence on the size of the 
contracted loan, we have inconclusive results. Estimated coefficients of Quotas have 
a positive influence on the Loan-GDP ratio, but it is statistically insignificant. 
Therefore, we cannot say with certainty if IMF Quotas has any weight in determining 
Conclusion  47 
 
the size of the loans granted. Contemporaneous loan size seems to be influenced only 
by its past level, at a 10% significance level. Considering our results, we need to 
employ a different set of parameters in the regression model, which can be a subject 
to further research. Previous research on this topic, by Barro & Lee (2005), argued 
that “probability and size of IMF loans were larger when a country had bigger quota, 
more nationals working on the professional staff, and more political and economic 
proximity to the United States and the major Western European countries”.                   
Results from the third part of our thesis, presented in Table 11, are suggesting that 
there is no significant relationship between Loan-GDP ratio and Inflation, even 
though estimated coefficient’s signs suggest and upward pressure on CPI level. FDI-
GDP’s coefficient signals a positive impact on the level of prices, in the current 
period, while the first lag has a substantial negative effect on current period Inflation. 
Our results confirm findings in previous studies (Barro & Lee, 2005). Holding other 
variables fixed, the Contr. of Corruption has a significant downward impact on the 
level of prices. In other words, fighting corruption helps decrease inflation levels. 
 
 
Bibliography  48 
 
Bibliography  
Arellano, M., & S. Bond (1991). Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte 
Carlo evidence and an application to employment equations. Review of 
Economic Studies 58: 277–297. 
Arellano, M., & O. Bover (1995). Another look at the instrumental variable 
estimation of error-components models. Journal of Econometrics 68: 29–51. 
Atoyan, R., & Conway, P. (2005). Evaluating the impact of IMF programs: A 
comparison of matching and instrumental-variable estimators. Review of 
International Organizations, 1(2), forthcoming. 
Bandow, D. (1994). The IMF: A record of addiction and failure. In D. Bandow, & I. 
Va´squez (Eds.), Perpetuating poverty; The World Bank, the IMF, and the 
Developing World (pp. 15–36). Washington, DC: Cato Institute. 
Barro, R. J., & Lee, J. W. (2005). IMF-programs: Who is chosen and what are the 
effects? Journal of Monetary Economics, 52, 1245–1269. 
Beveridge, W. A., & Kelly, M. R. (1980). Fiscal content of financial programs 
supported by stand-by arrangements in the upper credit tranches, 1969–78. IMF 
Staff Papers, 27, 205–249. 
Bird, G. (1986). Relationships, resource uses and the conditionality debate. In T. 
Killick (Ed.), The quest for economic stabilisation, The IMF and the Third 
World, Aldershot (pp. 145–182). 
Bird, G. (2001). IMF programs: Do they work? Can they be made to work better? 
World Development, 29(11), 1849–1865. 
Bird, G. and D. Rowlands (2001). “IMF Lending: How Is It Affected by Economic, 
Political and Institutional Factors,” Journal of Policy Reform, 4, 243-270. 
Blundell, R., and S. Bond. (1998). Initial conditions and moment restrictions in 
dynamic panel data models. Journal of Econometrics 87: 115–143 
Boockmann, B., and Dreher, A. (2003). The contribution of the IMF and the World 
Bank to economic freedom. European Journal of Political Economy, 19(3), 
633–649. 
Bibliography  49 
 
Bordo, M. and H. James (2000). “The International Monetary Fund: Its Present Role 
in Historical Perspective,” NBER Working Paper 7724, June. 
Breitung, J. (2000). Nonstationary panels, panel cointegration, and dynamic panels. 
Adv Econ, 15(2), 161-78. 
Choi, I. (2001). Unit root tests for panel data. Journal of international money and 
Finance, 20(2), 249-272. 
Davidson, R., & MacKinnon, J. G. (2004). Econometric theory and methods (Vol. 5). 
New York: Oxford University Press. 611-613 
Dreher, Axel. (2006). „IMF and Economic Growth: The Effects of Programs, Loans, 
and Compliance with Conditionality“. World Development Vol. 34, No. 5, pp. 
769–788 
Dreher, A., & Walter, S. (2010). Does the IMF Help or Hurt? The Effect of IMF 
programs on the likelihood and outcome of currency crises. World 
Development, 38(1), 1-18. 
Edwards, M. S. (2001, August). Sticking with yes: domestic institutions and IMF 
compliance. In Annual Meeting of American Political Science Association. 
Feldstein, M. (1998). Refocusing the IMF, Foreign Affairs, March/April Issue. 
Fischer, S. (2001). Address in Moscow. IMF Survey 30. 14, July 16, pp. 237–239. 
Greene, W. H. (2012). Econometric Analysis, 7th ed. Chapter 11. page 385. 
Hadri, K. (2000). Testing for stationarity in heterogeneous panel data. The 
Econometrics Journal, 3(2), 148-161. 
Hardoy, I. (2003). Effect of IMF programmes on growth: A reappraisal using the 
method of matching. Paper presented at the European Economic Association, 
Stockholm, 20–24 August 2003. 
Harris, R. D., & Tzavalis, E. (1999). Inference for unit roots in dynamic panels where 
the time dimension is fixed. Journal of econometrics, 91(2), 201-226. 
Hedlund, S. (2001). Russia and the IMF: A Sordid Tale of Moral Hazard. 
Demokratizatsiya. 9(1) 104-104. Web. 23 Apr. 2016. 
Hutchison, M. M., and Noy, I. (2003). Macroeconomic effects of IMF-sponsored 
programs in Latin America: Output costs, program recidivism and the vicious 
cycle of failed stabilization. Journal of International Money and Finance, 
22(7), 991–1014. 
Bibliography  50 
 
Ikejiaku, B. V. (2008). Africa Debate Crisis and the IMF with a Case of Nigeria: 
Towards Theoretical Explanations. J. Pol. & L., 1, 2. 
Im, K. S., Pesaran, M. H., & Shin, Y. (2003). Testing for unit roots in heterogeneous 
panels. Journal of econometrics, 115(1), 53-74. 
International Monetary Fund. (2014). Annual Report of the Executive Board for 
Financial Year Ended April 30, 2014, Appendix VI: Financial Statements as of 
April 30, 2014, page 28. [online] Available at: 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/ar/2014/eng/pdf/a6.pdf. [Accessed: 10th 
January 2015]. 
International Monetary Fund. (2014). Annual Report Of The Executive Board For 
The Financial Year Ended April 30, 2014, Chapter 5: Finances, Organization 
and Accountability, page 65. [online] Available at:  
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/ar/2014/eng/pdf/ch5.pdf. [Accessed: 10th 
January 2015]. 
International Monetary Fund. (2014). IMF Conditionality. [online] Available at: 
https://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/conditio.htm. [Accessed: 27th 
December 2014]. 
International Monetary Fund. (2014). IMF Executive Directors and Voting Power. 
[online] Available at: http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/eds.aspx. 
[Accessed: 10th January 2015]. 
International Monetary Fund. (2014). IMF at a Glance. [online] Available at: 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/pdf/glance.pdf. [Accessed: 27th 
December 2014]. 
International Monetary Fund. (2014). IMF Quotas. [online] Available at: 
https://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/quotas.htm. [Accessed: 27th 
December 2014]. 
International Monetary Fund. (2014). Lending by the IMF. [online] Available at: 
https://www.imf.org/external/about/lending.htm. [Accessed: 27th December 
2014]. 
International Monetary Fund. (2014). Special Drawing Rights. [online] Available at: 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/sdr.htm. [Accessed: 27th December 
2014]. 
Bibliography  51 
 
Joyce, J. P. (2004). The adoption, implementation and impact of IMF programs: A 
review of the issues and evidence. Comparative Economics Studies, 46(3), 
451–467 
Kaufmann, D., & Kraay, A. (2002). Growth without governance. World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper, (2928). 
Kaufmann, D., & Kraay, A. (2003). Governance and Growth: Causality which way? 
Evidence for the World, in brief. Manuscript. World Bank publication. 
Kaufmann, D. and Kraay, A. and Mastruzzi, M., (2010) The Worldwide Governance 
Indicators: Methodology and Analytical Issues. World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper No. 5430. [online] Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1682130. [Accessed: 16th February 2016]. 
Killick, T. (1994). Adjustment and economic growth. In J. M. Boughton, & K. S. 
Lateef (Eds.), Fifty years after Bretton Woods—The future of the IMF and the 
World Bank. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund and World Bank 
Group. 
Knight, M. and J. Santaella, (1997). “Economic Determinants of IMF Financial 
Arrangements,” Journal of Development Economics, 54, 495-526. 
Kutner, M. H.; Nachtsheim, C. J.; Neter, J. (2004). Applied Linear Regression 
Models (4th ed.). McGraw-Hill Irwin. 408-410 
Levin, A., Lin, C. F., & Chu, C. S. J. (2002). Unit root tests in panel data: asymptotic 
and finite-sample properties. Journal of econometrics, 108(1), 1-24.  
Meltzer, A. H. (2005). Reviving the bank and the fund. Review of International 
Organizations, 1(1), 49–60. 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2008). OECD 
Benchmark Definition of Foreign Direct Investment - 4th Edition. [online] 
Available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investmentstatisticsandanalysis/40193734.pdf. 
[Accessed: 27th of January 2016]. 
Przeworski, A., & Vreeland, J. R. (2000). The effect of IMF programs on economic 
growth. Journal of Development Economics, 62, 385–421. 
Roodman, D. (2009). How to do xtabond2: An introduction to difference and system 
GMM in Stata. Stata Journal, 9(1), 86-136. 
Bibliography  52 
 
Santaella, J. A. (1996). Stylized facts before IMF-supported macroeconomic 
adjustment. IMF Staff Papers, 43(3), 502–544. 
Stata: Stata manual, xtunitroot - Panel-data unit-root tests. [online] Available at: 
http://www.stata.com/features/overview/panel-data-unit-root-tests/ [Accessed: 
4th of July 2016]. 
Steinwand, M. C., & Stone, R. W. (2008). The International Monetary Fund: A 
review of the recent evidence. The Review of International Organizations, 3(2), 
123-149. 
Stiglitz, J. (2004) "The Post Washington Consensus Consensus" (PDF). 
policydialogue.org. The Initiative for Policy Dialogue. [Accessed: 27th of 
September 2016]. 
Trichet, J. C. (July 1, 2004). Introductory statement to the semiannual Monetary 
Policy Report. Federal Reserve Board. 
Vaubel, R. (1983). The moral hazard of IMF lending. In A. H. Meltzer (Ed.), 
International lending and the International Monetary Fund: A conference in 







Appendix A: Countries included in the analysis  53 
 
Appendix A: Countries included in the 
analysis 
Albania Algeria Angola Antigua Barbuda Argentina 
Armenia Australia Austria Azerbaijan Bahamas 
Bahrain Bangladesh Barbados Belarus Belgium 
Belize Benin Bermuda Bhutan Bolivia 
Bosnia 
Herzegovina 
Botswana Brazil Brunei Bulgaria 
Burkina Faso Burundi Cabo Verde Cambodia Cameroon 
Canada Central African 
Rep. 
Chad Chile China 
Colombia Comoros Congo 
Dem.Rep. 
CongoRep CostaRica 
CotedIvoire Croatia Cuba Cyprus Czech Rep. 
Denmark Djibouti Dominica Dominican Rep. Ecuador 
Egypt El Salvador Equat. Guinea Eritrea Estonia 
Ethiopia Fiji Finland France Gabon 
Gambia Georgia Germany Ghana Greece 
Grenada Guatemala Guinea Guinea Bissau Guyana 
Haiti Honduras HongKong Hungary Iceland 
India Indonesia Iran Iraq Ireland 
Israel Italy Jamaica Japan Jordan 
Kazakhstan Kenya Kiribati KoreaSouth Kuwait 
Kyrgyz Rep. Lao PDR Latvia Lebanon Lesotho 
Liberia Liechtenstein Lithuania Luxembourg Macao 
Macedonia Madagascar Malawi Malaysia Mali 
Malta Marshall  Islands Mauritania Mauritius Mexico 
Micronesia Moldova Monaco Mongolia Morocco 
Mozambique Myanmar Namibia Nepal Netherlands 
New Zealand Nicaragua Niger Nigeria Norway 
Oman Pakistan Palau Panama Pap. New Guinea 
Paraguay Peru Philippines Poland Portugal 
Qatar Romania Russian 
Federation 
Rwanda Samoa 
San Marino SaudiArabia Senegal Serbia Seychelles 
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Sierra Leone Singapore Slovak Rep Slovenia Solomon Islands 
South Africa Spain Sri Lanka StKittsNevis St Lucia 
StVincent 
Grenadines 
Sudan Suriname Swaziland Sweden 
Switzerland Syria Tajikistan Tanzania Thailand 
Togo Tonga Trinidad Tobago Tunisia Turkey 
Turkmenistan Tuvalu UAE Uganda Ukraine 
United Kingdom United States Uruguay Uzbekistan Vanuatu 
Venezuela Vietnam West Bank Gaza Yemen Zambia 
Zimbabwe     
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Appendix B: Content of Enclosed DVD  
There is a DVD enclosed to this thesis, which contains empirical data and Stata 
source codes.  
 Folder 1: Source codes  
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Appendix C: Data Diagnostics 
Table 14: Stationarity – Fisher type-ADF test (lag 0) - full dataset 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 







Z  Z: p-
value 
GDP growth 186 7.89 1606.482 0.00 -20.793 0.0000 
Ln(GDPpercap) 185 7.95 599.231 0.00 3.027 0.9988 
Inflation 173 7.23 2049.679 0.00 -19.283 0.0000 
Ln(Inflation) 173 7.15 744.979 0.00 -5.210 0.0000 
FDI-GDP ratio 181 7.38 747.235 0.00 -1.513 0.0652 
Loan-GDP ratio 117 7.84 576.027 0.00 -9.610 0.0000 
Ln(Loan-GDP ratio) 108 5.30 415.693 0.00 -5.564 0.0000 
Quotas 179 7.93 2428.525 0.00 -18.924 0.0000 
Large quotas 186 9 19.399 1.00 -0.137 0.4456 
Contr. of Corruption 184 3.98 2178.551 0.00 -15.489 0.0000 
Voice & Account. 186 4 2276.453 0.00 -16.507 0.0000 
Gov. Effectiv. 184 3.98 1506.478 0.00 -8.213 0.0000 
Rule of Law 186 4 1897.068 0.00 -10.558 0.0000 
Low Income 186 9 58.211 1.00 3.100 0.9990 
Middle Income 186 9 107.713 1.00 3.866 0.9999 
Notes: Variables in bold are not stationary and have to be either transformed or dropped from the 













Appendix C: Data Diagnostics  57 
 
 
Table 15: Collinearity Diagnostics (excl. Low Inc)
13
 
Variable VIF SQRT VIF Tolerance R- Squared 
Ln (GDP per cap) 4.52 2.13 0.2211 0.7789 
Inflation 1.04 1.02 0.9651 0.0349 
Ln(FDI-GDP ratio) 1.17 1.08 0.8571 0.1429 
Loan-GDP ratio 1.07 1.04 0.9305 0.0695 
Quotas 3.45 1.86 0.2896 0.7104 
Large quotas 3.16 1.78 0.3161 0.6839 
Contr. of Corruption 4.98 2.23 0.2006 0.7994 
Voice & Account. 2.36 1.54 0.4236 0.5764 
Gov. Effectiveness 5.21 2.28 0.1921 0.8079 
Rule of Law 5.63 2.37 0.1776 0.8224 
Middle Income 3.75 1.94 0.267 0.733 
Mean VIF 3.3 
   Notes: Variance Inflation Factor, or VIF, measures the degree of inflation of variance of the estimated 
coefficients as compared to the case when variables are not linearly related (Kutner, 2005). A VIF 
value larger than 10 is an indicator of multicollinearity. In addition to that, Squared VIF reveals the 
degree of ”inflation” of the standard error for the instrument’s coefficient, compared to the event when 
the variable were not correlated with another one, in the data set. VIF values highlighted are the cause 
of multicollinearity in our dataset. 
 
Table 16: Collinearity Diagnostics (excl. Middle Inc)
14
 
Variable VIF SQRT VIF Tolerance R- Squared 
Ln (GDP per cap) 4.52 2.13 0.2211 0.7789 
Inflation 1.04 1.02 0.9651 0.0349 
Ln(FDI-GDP ratio) 1.17 1.08 0.8571 0.1429 
Loan-GDP ratio 1.07 1.04 0.9305 0.0695 
Quotas 3.45 1.86 0.2896 0.7104 
Large quotas 3.16 1.78 0.3161 0.6839 
Contr. of Corruption 4.98 2.23 0.2006 0.7994 
Voice & Account. 2.36 1.54 0.4236 0.5764 
Gov. Effectiveness 5.21 2.28 0.1921 0.8079 
Rule of Law 5.63 2.37 0.1776 0.8224 
Low Income 3.75 1.94 0.267 0.733 
Mean VIF 3.3 
   Notes: Variance Inflation Factor, or VIF, measures the degree of inflation of variance of the estimated 
coefficients as compared to the case when variables are not linearly related (Kutner, 2005). A VIF 
value larger than 10 is an indicator of multicollinearity. In addition to that, Squared VIF reveals the 
degree of ”inflation” of the standard error for the instrument’s coefficient, compared to the event when 
the variable were not correlated with another one, in the data set. VIF values highlighted are the cause 
of multicollinearity in our dataset. 
                                                          
13
 Low Income dummy was dropped from regression due to collinearity. Therefore, we will perform 
two separate regressions, where we will exclude one of the two Income dummies. 
14
 Middle Income dummy was dropped from regression due to collinearity. Therefore, we will perform 
two separate regressions, where we will exclude one of the two Income dummies. 
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Figure 4: Poverty trap representation 
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Appendix E: Correlation matrix 
1) Excel data analysis 
GDP growth 1 
            Ln GDP per cap -0.068 1 
           Inflation -0.239 -0.08 1 
          Ln FDI-GDP 0.187 0.207 -0.141 1 
         Loan-GDP -0.057 -0.168 0.001 -0.015 1 
        Quotas -0.043 0.297 -0.021 -0.098 -0.076 1 
       Large quotas -0.059 0.334 -0.02 -0.064 -0.075 0.59 1 
      Contr. Corrupt -0.205 0.772 -0.135 0.119 -0.072 0.311 0.331 1 
     Voice & Account. -0.276 0.644 -0.137 0.088 -0.002 0.234 0.280 0.767 1 
    Gov. Eff. -0.193 0.818 -0.132 0.114 -0.118 0.348 0.380 0.937 0.775 1 
   Rule of Law -0.213 0.786 -0.159 0.103 -0.088 0.310 0.309 0.935 0.829 0.930 1 
  Low Income 0.031 -0.790 0.045 -0.157 0.159 -0.190 -0.215 -0.493 -0.491 -0.539 -0.549 1 

























2) Stata  
GDP growth 1 
            Ln GDP per cap -0.158 1 
           Inflation 0.003 -0.093 1 
          Ln FDI-GDP 0.173 0.281 0.031 1 
         Loan-GDP 0.063 -0.184 0.019 0.090 1 
        Quotas 0.131 0.186 -0.004 -0.093 -0.056 1 
       Large quotas 0.066 0.153 -0.017 -0.073 -0.052 0.802 1 
      Contr. Corrupt -0.067 0.497 -0.14 0.183 -0.08 0.022 0.037 1 
     Voice & Account. -0.19 0.464 -0.129 0.211 -0.015 -0.044 0.062 0.658 1 
    Gov. Eff. -0.004 0.589 -0.117 0.17 -0.129 0.207 0.148 0.837 0.637 1 
   Rule Law -0.053 0.49 -0.161 0.181 -0.094 0.055 0.015 0.862 0.707 0.842 1 
  Low Inc 0.127 -0.85 0.076 -0.178 0.160 -0.156 -0.085 -0.445 -0.392 -0.516 -0.447 1 
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